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These complementary works are among two of the most recent efforts to 
make use of the nearly 1,800 interviews conducted by the Irish govern-
ment's Bureau of Military History starting in 1947, but not made available 
to historians until 2003. The witness statements collected by the Bureau 
comprise 36,000 pages of evidence and more than 150,000 documents 
chronicling the personal experiences of Irish citizens and soldiers during 
the events of the early 20th century through the War of Independence. 
Together, these books provide a chronological story of the Easter Rising 
and the War of Independence.
Unfortunately, no subsequent volume is likely to conclude what would be 
an obvious trilogy with the completion of a new study of the Irish Civil 
War based on the Bureau's collection. Interviewers seldom questioned 
witnesses about their role in that sad affair, the wounds of which festered 
among families and neighbors for many years afterwards, and which 
remains to this day an unfit subject for discussion among many in Ire-
land. Despite the Bureau's short-sighted decision to ignore the Civil War 
in its interviews, historians must be grateful for the work that was done to 
preserve accounts of the Rising and the War of Independence.
Though very different books, these works provide an interesting and use-
ful glimpse into how those interviews can enhance our understanding of 
the events. Lessons applicable to students and professionals in the fields 
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of Intelligence and Counterterrorism are apparent throughout both 
books; and like many subsequent leaders of wars of national liberation, 
students and professionals would do well likewise to note the universality 
of goals, strategies, and tactics. Weaponry, it seems, is mostly what differ-
entiates the efforts of Irish men and women to win their freedom from the 
efforts of Ho Chi Minh to unite his country. Parallels with today's insur-
gencies should also not be lost on us.
Fearghal McGarry's book is the stronger of the two. A Senior Lecturer in 
History at Queen's University, Belfast, McGarry provides a tale of the 
Easter Rising of 1916 that is effectively organized, highly insightful, and 
exceedingly well-written. McGarry does not attempt a full historical 
account of the Rising, and for that purpose one would do well to consult 
Charles Townshend's Easter 1916: The Irish Rebellion, published by 
Penguin in 2005. Instead, his stated purpose is to "convey how the 
rebellion was experienced, particularly by ordinary Volunteers and 
civilians…." (p. 124). He is too modest. He does much more than that, 
starting with a lucid account of the events that shaped the generation of 
Irishmen destined to live during the seminal period that marked a 
watershed in the course of Irish history. He first recognizes the pitfalls of 
using the Bureau's interviews as sources, noting how certain memories 
create "retrospectively…a sense of meaning in the narrative of one's own 
life…" and cloud the "multitude of influences" (p. 39) that shaped 
individual politicization. For many ordinary citizens, McGarry claims, 
that politicization encompassed a hostility to Britain, the embrace of a 
distinctive Irish culture, and "a commitment to an abstract ideal of Irish 
freedom" (p. 41).
McGarry next chronicles the rise of a fighting force capable of sustaining a 
war of national liberation, starting with the response to the Ulster Union-
ist formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). It now seems odd in 
retrospect, but some republicans of the day celebrated the formation of 
the UVF as at least some measure of resistance to British authority. Many 
did not take it seriously, failing to recognize it as a real step towards the 
radicalization of Unionism. Still, the counter to that force was the forma-
tion of the Irish Volunteers, quickly infiltrated at top leadership levels by 
the more militant Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB). Founders of the 
Volunteers saw their organization as a bulwark against the threat posed 
by the UVF, while IRB leaders among the Volunteers viewed their army as 
the foundation for insurrection.
McGarry uses this opportunity to bring in the Bureau's interviews to 
describe the social structure of the Volunteers. The absence of "people of 
importance" (p. 60) among the top leaders led some authorities to under-
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estimate the threat posed by the Irish Volunteers. Though the average 
Volunteer was of modest social standing, the same was not so true for the 
women of Cumann na mBan, an auxiliary group formed to support the 
all-male Volunteers. McGarry provides less insight into the much smaller 
Irish Citizen Army (ICA), a socialist labor force then led by James Con-
nolly. In socialist fashion, women were welcomed among its ranks as 
fighters, providing opportunities for zealous radicals like Countess Con-
stance Markievicz to don a fashionable ICA uniform and wield an over-
sized revolver.
No matter their social status or their aims, those who took up arms 
against British rule in 1916 were deeply motivated, but by what? McGarry 
tackles that question by relying again on the accounts of participants. His-
torians have often responded to that question by citing the embrace of 
Patrick Pearse's ideas of a blood-sacrifice redeeming the Irish nation; 
such ideas have an appeal, considering the deeply religious nature of Irish 
society at that time. The futility of such an ill-armed, badly trained, and 
strategically inept force standing up to the might of the British Empire 
would seem to support the notion that the Rising was little more than 
mass suicide. Yet, McGarry points out, at the time the rebellion was 
planned, Pearse was too minor a character among the Volunteers to have 
had such influence on the decision to act. It seems more likely that ideas 
revolving around German assistance that might lead to success were seri-
ously considered. Or, in the event of the rebels' defeat and a German vic-
tory on the Continent, the claim to a seat at the table when a peace 
conference ended The Great War was possible. But even those reasons are 
less likely than two simple facts. The necessity for an insurrection during 
the First World War, while Britain was taxed on the Western Front, was a 
"rational…moral and historical imperative if Fenianism was to retain any 
credibility or future" (p. 98). In addition, there was an emotional compo-
nent as well, "born out of frustration, shame, and pessimism" (p. 98).
McGarry also poses the question of how the authorities failed to predict 
the onset of the Rising. The finger must be glaringly pointed at the British 
Intelligence system. It comprised no less than five separate intelligence-
gathering bodies, most of which failed to share information with one 
another, but strangely too, failed to share it even with those in Dublin 
Castle who might have acted on it. In a comment that could reflect any 
number of more recent intelligence failures, McGarry notes that in addi-
tion to the convoluted bureaucracy, the failure stemmed more from an 
inability to act on the information possessed, rather than from a lack of 
information itself. The Irish police forces also come in for criticism in that 
they failed to devote proper resources to intelligence-gathering. Again 
echoing modern parallels, one sees that the speed at which intelligence 
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information is gathered, analyzed, disseminated, and acted upon is key to 
success. Only one human source provided advance warning of the Rising, 
and that information was still navigating the police bureaucracy two days 
later when the event came to pass. Ultimately, though, McGarry places 
blame on the political leaders in Dublin Castle who had it within their 
power to reform the intelligence processes then in use.
Despite all the discussion about motivation and rationale for the Rising, 
the fact remains that all those factors applied only to those who actually 
came out during Easter Week—only a small percentage of the number of 
Volunteers on the rolls. Only about a thousand Volunteers mobilized 
initially, with another three hundred or so falling in over the next few 
days. Although there was initial disagreement among some Volunteer 
leaders about the rectitude of their judgment, and miscommunication 
about whether or not to mobilize, once the event was underway, what kept 
so many Volunteers at home? No one has satisfactorily answered that 
question. On the other hand, what prompted one young soldier from the 
Royal Irish Rifles, home on leave in Dublin, to respond to a call to return 
to his barracks by reporting instead to his family home and joining his two 
Volunteer brothers? "'My mother put her arms around me,' he recalled, 
'God bless you, I knew you would do it,' and she burned my British 
uniform" (p. 126).
Unified leadership and a more militant ethos led to about two-thirds of 
Connolly's ICA turning out. It was a much higher percentage than the Vol-
unteers, but it amounted only to another 219 men and woman under 
arms. One is left to speculate kindly that most of the Volunteers viewed 
their chances of success more rationally and were not so zealous as to 
allow their enthusiasm to overwhelm their common sense. Yet, had it not 
been for those who made the sacrifice, it is highly questionable whether 
Mr. McKenna would have had anything to write about in the next book 
under review here. Fortunately for Ireland, a good showing of committed 
republicans turned out to see what they could do for Kate Houlihan in 
1916.
Finally, it was the legacy of the Rising that set the stage for the next step in 
Ireland's freedom from British rule and its evolution as a nation. Without 
the Rising, McGarry states, "Irish nationalism would not have united 
under the banner of republicanism," previously considered by most to be 
an extreme and unattainable goal. The Rising also revived and legitimized 
"the physical force tradition" in Ireland. Finally, though not the subject of 
these books, the Rising undermined the possibility of compromise, thus 
leading directly to the onset of the Irish Civil War. Those committed to a 
republic could not settle on an Irish Free State. Meanwhile, in 1919, Irish 
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men and women were again prepared to strike a blow for freedom, this 
time far more successfully.
Joseph McKenna, former senior assistant librarian in the Central Library 
at Birmingham, England, takes up that story and makes very different use 
of the Bureau of Military History statements, liberally interspersing mate-
rial from more traditional accounts, such as the widely familiar memoirs 
of Tom Barry, Dan Breen, and Ernie O'Mally. McKenna also brings more 
of the British perspective into his work, using resources from the Public 
Records Office in London, as well as Parliamentary Papers. His book is of 
a different caliber than McGarry's in that McKenna allows the sources to 
speak largely for themselves with less context and historical analysis. It is 
less a book of ideas than a book of facts, though they are interesting ones 
and generally well presented. It is also replete with first-hand observa-
tions from participants in the events that followed the 1916 Rising, and 
that in itself is of much value to readers.
McKenna begins with a chapter that briefly summarizes the events of Eas-
ter Week, 1916. He then moves on to a discussion of political and military 
reorganization in two following chapters. Of the Rising, McKenna notes 
that the harsh treatment and executions of the Irish leaders set the tone 
for a vital change in public sentiment that would be necessary in an ensu-
ing war of independence. British prison camps became "the universities of 
Republicanism" (p. 39), binding men to their cause and enabling the revi-
talization of an army in Ireland upon their release and return home. The 
Conscription Bill that passed in the spring of 1918, when the final result of 
the First World War was still very much undecided, was the issue that led 
most directly to widespread public opposition to British governance. The 
threat of conscription provided an immeasurable boost to the Irish Volun-
teers, poised to defend against that threat by force. In the end, force 
proved unnecessary, and the war ended without conscription being 
enacted in Ireland. Nevertheless, the Irish Volunteers (known subse-
quently as the Irish Republican Army (IRA)) continued to evolve into an 
effective force. Structural changes at the General Headquarters level led 
to a focus on propaganda with the creation of a department for that pur-
pose. McKenna notes that the War of Independence was "perhaps the first 
modern war where propaganda…was to play a major part…in shaping 
opinion…." (p. 51).
Most importantly, before that evolving army could take up arms to 
dispute British rule in Ireland, the transition of public opinion from 
apathy to support was first required. That support built slowly, with 
resentment against the British, as noted above, resulting from their 
treatment of the leaders of 1916 and the threat of compelling Irishmen to 
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fight the Germans. The anti-conscription campaign was the first major 
step in converting the populace to the practice of passive resistance. Irish 
labor unions added to that resistance with a series of general strikes. 
Eventually, the height of resistance was reached by "just ignoring the 
British system" (p. 71) when Republican courts began to administer 
justice throughout Ireland.
Once war began, many of the successes or failures hinged on the outcome 
of the intelligence war, which is also the title of another chapter in the 
book. McKenna, like McGarry, notes that British failures were attribut-
able to the existence of multiple intelligence organizations with overlap-
ping functions, "but little exchange of information" (p. 79). That failure of 
communication played a significant role in Irish successes, and the fact 
that the problem persisted even after the failures of 1916 is a lesson that 
should not be lost on modern intelligence professionals. Largely, though, 
the story of the intelligence war is an age-old tale, with successes on both 
sides owing mostly to the use of informants. With hundreds of Irish citi-
zens in the employ of Dublin Castle, it stood to reason that some would 
supply information to the IRA, which ultimately got the best of the British 
as a result. Perhaps most importantly, it allowed the IRA to exercise some 
measure of control over the capital. The propaganda value of successful 
attacks in Dublin was significant. Attacks in the city undermined British 
authority and demonstrated to the world that Britain was not even "in 
control of the most heavily patrolled city in the world" (p. 97).
Discussion of the war years progresses through three chapters, each 
devoted separately to one year of the conflict, starting with the 
Soloheadbeg Ambush on January 21, 1919, and ending with the truce and 
eventual Anglo-Irish Treaty of December 6, 1921. These chapters follow 
the war's events from the first-hand accounts of the participants. Actions 
consisted primarily of raids on Royal Irish Constabulary (RCI) barracks to 
obtain arms, or ambushes of RIC or British Army troops at opportune 
positions along rural Irish roads. Earlier in the war, the need for arms and 
munitions dictated Volunteer efforts. Later, attacks on Crown forces 
intensified.
McKenna points out some failures that were largely attributable to a lack 
of experience and training. In one case, Volunteers captured an officer of 
the coastguard garrison at Castletownberre Station. They failed to search 
him, and at an appropriate moment the officer pulled a revolver and 
wounded several of his would-be captors. In another failed effort, Volun-
teers returned to an ambush site three days running in an effort to catch 
an expected motorized army patrol. Instead, their presence must have 
been revealed by some observer, and the ambushers soon found them-
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selves on the receiving end of a British ambush. Still, the nature of the war 
favored the Volunteers, who derived support from the local population 
and could melt away into the towns or countryside after a successful 
ambush.
As more and more Volunteers were identified or suspected of insurrection 
and unable to return to their homes, flying columns of such men were 
formed on the Boer War model. Instead of acting in an individual and 
uncoordinated fashion, these men formed a standing body of troops able 
to act much more decisively. The flying column, McKenna claims, is what 
evened the odds between the smaller number of Volunteers and the over-
whelming numbers of Crown forces. The flying columns around the coun-
try eventually grew large enough to take on sizable contingents of British 
forces and prevail. Their knowledge of the country and an active intelli-
gence capability typically enabled them to avoid even large-scale British 
attempts to surround and destroy them. The story is an eerily familiar 
one. One could undoubtedly substitute any number of names for "Irish" 
and "British" and tell much the same tale.
McKenna concludes with precisely that observation regarding the legacy 
of the Irish War of Independence, claiming that it served as the model for 
the eventual downfall of British Imperialism (though he fails to credit the 
impact of World War II as contributing to that trend). Accounts of the war 
were required reading at many military academies. In less formal settings, 
other revolutionaries of the 20th century made a similar study of the sub-
ject. It served them well. The difficulties of countering wars of national 
liberation persist.
Both of these books are worth reading for the perspective they provide on 
all the myriad facets of revolutionary thoughts, ideologies, politics, and 
military actions that still ring true today. Perhaps no more telling indica-
tion of that is McKenna's quote from the Lord Mayor of Cork, Terrence 
MacSwiney, who observed in 1920 that "It is not those who can inflict the 
most, but those who can suffer the most who will conquer" (p. 132). Ho 
Chi Minh must have watched the events unfolding in Ireland with keen 
interest.
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